

Leading to Gain: Power, Status, and Indonesia's GPEDC Co-Chairmanship

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Abstract: Indonesia's co-chairmanship of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC, 2023–2026) raises a puzzle: why would an emerging middle power invest heavily in a voluntary, non-binding aid-effectiveness partnership? This study examines that question through a classical realist lens augmented by middle-power theory, using a qualitative single-case design that combines theory-guided content analysis of policy documents, official statements, and development data with process tracing of Indonesia's GPEDC engagement from late 2022 through 2025. The analysis finds that Indonesia used the co-chair platform to steer development resources toward its own priorities, expand its diplomatic reach by courting G20 and non-DAC partners, secure relative gains over traditional donors through mutual-accountability norms, and build international prestige as a South–South cooperation leader. These findings show that a normatively framed multilateral initiative can also function as an arena for power-seeking, and they extend middle-power theory by tracing how an emerging power balances reformist ambition with the existing order.

Keywords: *GPEDC co-chairmanship, classical realism, middle-power theory, status-seeking, relative gains, South–South cooperation, niche diplomacy, Indonesian foreign policy*

INTRODUCTION

The scholarly significance of Indonesia's recent leadership in the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC) lies in what it reveals about the intersection of power politics and development governance. Classical realism in IR theory emphasizes that states operate as rational unitary actors in an anarchic international system, driven chiefly by the pursuit of power, security, and national interest (Morgenthau, 1948). From this realist perspective, ostensibly altruistic engagement in multilateral development initiatives can mask strategic calculations. Indonesia's decision to assume GPEDC co-chairmanship from 2023 to 2026, its second stint following the inaugural 2013–2014 term, constitutes a non-trivial investment of diplomatic capital that demands analytical explanation: at face value it signals commitment to global norms of effective aid, but the pattern of Indonesia's engagement suggests a calculated bid to enhance its influence and positional gains in the international development regime.

As an emerging middle power – a G20 member and the world's third-largest democracy – Indonesia has both the incentive and the capacity to use such cooperative leadership roles to project power and advance its status (Crawford, 2003). This paper asks: How does Indonesia's GPEDC co-chairmanship serve its national interests and power objectives? Addressing this question fills a notable research gap. While Indonesia's foreign aid and South–South cooperation efforts have been studied through liberal and constructivist lenses (focusing on norms, identity, and cooperation), there is a paucity of analysis through a realist lens that interrogates underlying power motives and strategic benefits. By examining Indonesia's GPEDC role with a realist and middle-power theoretical framework, this study aims to illuminate the often under-acknowledged *realpolitik* driving emerging donor behavior.

The GPEDC was established in 2011 at the Busan High-Level Forum to improve the effectiveness of development aid, bringing

together traditional donors, recipient countries, emerging providers, civil society, and other actors under agreed principles (country ownership, focus on results, inclusive partnerships, and mutual accountability). Indonesia has been involved since the outset – it co-chaired the inaugural GPEDC meetings in 2013–2014 and then resumed a co-chair role in 2023 (Sidiropoulos, 2019). Existing literature on GPEDC and global aid effectiveness largely adopts liberal institutionalist perspectives, emphasizing mutual benefits, norm diffusion, and collective problem-solving in development cooperation. Studies highlight Indonesia's advocacy of South–South cooperation norms, its promotion of “Indonesia Incorporated” approaches to development, and its contributions to inclusive partnerships as examples of norm entrepreneurship.

Constructivist analyses similarly stress Indonesia's identity as a bridge-builder between global North and South, rooted in its Bandung Conference heritage of solidarity. While these perspectives acknowledge Indonesia's agency, they often downplay or ignore the element of power competition and interest-maximization. The realist viewpoint, by contrast, sensitizes us to how power asymmetries and national advantage persist even within cooperative frameworks. Who sets the agenda in forums like the GPEDC? How do emerging powers leverage such platforms to increase their relative power? These questions remain insufficiently explored. This study addresses that gap by reframing Indonesia's GPEDC co-chairmanship not as a purely altruistic endeavor but as an arena for pursuing strategic interests under multilateral cover. The literature on middle-power diplomacy offers a productive but underexploited entry point. Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal (1993) identified 'niche diplomacy' as the characteristic strategy by which states of intermediate capability amplify their influence through targeted multilateral engagement. Jordaan (2003) refined this by distinguishing traditional middle powers—typically wealthy, stable democracies supporting the status quo—from emerging middle powers that combine regional leadership with reformist ambitions. Indonesia falls squarely into the latter category. Yet existing middle-power scholarship has not systematically tested whether GPEDC co-

chairmanship functions as such a niche for Indonesia, or whether it generates the positional returns that niche diplomacy theory predicts. Schweller's (1994) work on revisionist states seeking to alter the distribution of goods in their favor, and Larson and Shevchenko's (2010) framework on status-seeking strategies, provide additional theoretical traction for understanding why a state would invest in leading a voluntary, non-binding partnership. The gap, then, is not merely the absence of realism from GPEDC scholarship but the absence of any systematic account connecting Indonesia's multilateral development leadership to its strategic interest calculus and relative power positioning.

This study therefore asks: How does Indonesia's co-chairmanship of GPEDC (2023–2025) serve as an instrument of middle-power strategy to advance national interests and enhance relative positional power in the international development regime? From this are derived three specific objectives: (1) to identify Indonesia's strategic motives in assuming and exercising the GPEDC co-chairmanship; (2) to analyze how this leadership role enhances Indonesia's influence over development cooperation agendas and resources; and (3) to assess the outcomes of Indonesia's co-chairmanship in terms of tangible gains in power, security, or status. In essence, the study probes whether Indonesia's involvement in GPEDC leadership is driven by the pursuit of relative gains and prestige (as realism would predict), rather than (or in addition to) the principled commitment to development effectiveness that is officially espoused.

The analysis marries classical realist theory with insights from middle-power theory to form a tailored framework. Classical realism provides the baseline assumptions: states are power-seeking actors operating under anarchy, and they prioritize national interest defined largely in terms of power (whether military, economic, or diplomatic) (Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1979). Cooperation is often a strategy to advance self-interest, and even moral or normative actions are ultimately subordinate to calculations of interest and advantage. However, realism alone does not differentiate between great powers,

middle powers, and small states in their institutional strategies; it often generalizes about “states” or focuses on great power rivalry. The middle-power dimension adds nuance by considering Indonesia's position in the international hierarchy. According to Jordaan (2003), traditional middle powers (e.g. Canada, Australia) are typically wealthy, stable democracies that support the status quo through multilateralism, whereas emerging middle powers are semi-peripheral, recently democratized states with regional influence that seek a greater voice in the order (Jordaan, 2003). Indonesia falls into the latter category: it is an emerging middle power characterized by regional leadership in Southeast Asia and a desire for reformist (but not radical) change in global governance (Dannhauer, 2023). Middle-power theory predicts such states will engage actively in multilateral institutions, often acting as coalition-builders and norm-shapers, but also that they will pursue distinct interests – for instance, championing issues that elevate their own standing or benefit their region. By combining these frameworks, this paper interprets Indonesia's GPEDC co-chairmanship as a middle-power strategy enacted in line with realist imperatives. We posit that Indonesia uses the GPEDC to increase its material control over development resources, extend its positional influence in diplomatic networks, maximize relative gains vis-à-vis other actors, and bolster its status or prestige as a leader in global development. These four dimensions (material control, positional influence, relative gains, status-seeking) derive from realist concepts but are inflected by Indonesia's middle-power identity, and they structure the empirical analysis in this study.

This research offers both empirical and theoretical contributions. Empirically, it provides a detailed account of Indonesia's activities and accomplishments as GPEDC co-chair (2023–2025 to date), drawing on official records, development cooperation monitoring data, and Indonesian policy documents. Theoretically, it demonstrates the value of a realist middle-power approach to understanding development cooperation leadership, a domain more commonly examined through liberal or constructivist lenses. The analysis shows how power and interest operate within a nominally

inclusive and normative initiative, thereby enriching realist theory with evidence from the development arena (often considered “low politics”). It also refines middle-power theory by illustrating how an emerging middle power balances normative commitments with realpolitik behavior. The scope of the study is deliberately focused: it examines Indonesia's co-chairmanship primarily through secondary sources (GPEDC reports, government statements, media coverage) and does not extend to primary interviews or confidential data. The timeframe is the co-chair term 2023–2026 (with reflections on the prior 2013–14 stint for context), and the emphasis is on Indonesia's behavior and perceptions; the paper does not evaluate the overall effectiveness of GPEDC or the perspective of other co-chairs (such as Sweden). These delimitations allow for depth of analysis on Indonesia's motives and actions. In what follows, the methodology is described, the realist middle-power framework is elaborated and operationalized, then the empirical results are presented according to the four analytical categories, and finally a discussion interprets the findings, addresses alternative explanations, and draws out implications for theory and policy.

METHOD

a. Philosophical and Methodological Foundations

1) Philosophical Orientation

This study adopts a qualitative single-case research design, focusing intensively on Indonesia's co-chairmanship of the GPEDC as a case of an emerging middle power in a leadership role. A single-case design is warranted given the exploratory nature of the research question and the depth of process-tracing required. Indonesia's GPEDC co-chairmanship is treated as a revelatory case where theoretical expectations from realism and middle-power scholarship can be observed in a contemporary real-world scenario. The goal is not broad generalization, but rather analytical refinement –

generating insights that can inform theory and potentially be tested against other cases in future research. The choice of a qualitative approach aligns with the complexity of the subject matter: motives, influence, and status are not easily reduced to numerical indicators alone and require interpretation of textual evidence and context.

Within this design, the methodology employs process tracing and content analysis. Process tracing is used to reconstruct the sequence of events and decisions from Indonesia's acceptance of the co-chair role (in late 2022) through the implementation of its duties (2023–2025), in order to identify causal mechanisms linking Indonesia's actions to its interests. Key process-tracing observations include Indonesia's policy preparations, its interactions in GPEDC meetings (e.g. steering committees, High-Level meetings), and any shifts in its behavior corresponding to changes in its interests or external pressures. Complementing this, a theory-guided content analysis is conducted on relevant documents and statements, systematically coding texts for evidence of four theoretical categories: references to material interests or control, indications of positional or diplomatic influence, expressions related to relative gains or competitive advantage, and statements suggestive of status-seeking or prestige.

This design is theory-guided in that the classical realist and middle-power framework informed both the data collection and analysis. However, the approach remains grounded in empiricism: multiple sources are triangulated to validate interpretations, and attention is paid to evidence that might contradict the theoretical expectations (so-called "deviant" observations). By combining deductive elements (testing if Indonesia's behavior matches realist-

middle-power predictions) with inductive sensitivity (noting unexpected findings), the methodology strikes a balance between theoretical structure and openness to the specific concepts this study introduces.

2) Data Generation Techniques

The data for this study draw from four categories of secondary sources. First, official GPEDC documents—including summit declarations, Steering Committee meeting minutes, and the 4th Monitoring Round country reports—provide institutional records of Indonesia's co-chairmanship behavior. Indonesia's own Country Results Brief and monitoring dataset (GPEDC, 2024) supply quantitative indicators on aid alignment, country-system usage, and stakeholder engagement. Second, Indonesian government publications encompass press releases by Bappenas and speeches by key officials, particularly Minister Suharso Monoarfa's remarks at the UN HLPF side event in July 2023 and Deputy Minister Ruddyard's statements at the 2025 Busan Forum. Third, OECD/DAC records—including the September 2023 DAC meeting summary—document how traditional donors perceived and responded to Indonesia's co-chairmanship agenda. Fourth, media coverage and independent analyses, including Eurodad's assessment of the Geneva Summit monitoring framework and Tahalele's (2021) account of Indonesian AID's institutional development, provide external validation and critical perspective. Data were collected through systematic searches in English and Indonesian for the period December 2022 through mid-2025, and evaluated for credibility through source triangulation, balancing

Indonesia's self-reports with external evaluations. Where possible, data on outcomes (such as development finance flows or monitoring scores) are used to corroborate claims of success or influence.

3) **Data Analysis**

The analysis proceeded in iterative steps. First, a timeline of key events was constructed (e.g., announcement of co-chairmanship in December 2022; Indonesia taking office in 2023; first monitoring round activities in 2023–24; global forums in 2024 and 2025). This timeline helped anchor the process tracing. Next, documents and transcripts were coded according to the four categories (material control, positional influence, relative gains, status). For example, when reading the GPEDC Country Results Brief for Indonesia, notes were made on data points such as the "extent of engagement with stakeholders" score and the fact that Indonesia has not set country-level targets for development cooperation. These were interpreted in light of material control and, possibly, relative gains. Each piece of evidence was thus categorized, and patterns were analyzed to assess whether evidence consistently pointed to interest-driven motives or revealed contradictions.

To strengthen validity, the study employs triangulation: key claims are supported by multiple independent sources where possible, and consistency over time is checked. The method acknowledges that inferring intent from public statements has limitations, as actors may cloak interests in rhetoric; to address this, the paper juxtaposes rhetoric with outcome-based data and third-party observations wherever feasible. The principal limitation is reliance on publicly available documents, which cannot capture

closed-door negotiations or unpublicized motivations. This constraint is mitigated by focusing on observable outputs—monitoring metrics, event hosting, agenda items, and official statements—rather than inferred intentions. No primary human-subjects data were collected; all sources are drawn from the public record.

b. Theoretical Framework and Conceptual Model

To rigorously apply the classical realism + middle-power framework, key concepts are defined and translated into observable indicators. In realist theory, the fundamental concept of national interest is understood as the objectives that a state prioritizes to ensure its security, prosperity, and power. Morgenthau (1948) famously asserted that national interests are pursued in terms of power – meaning states seek to accumulate capabilities and influence to safeguard their survival and achieve their goals. For this study, Indonesia's national interest in the development cooperation context is operationalized as including: securing external resources for economic development and recovery, shaping international norms in ways favorable to its sovereignty and values, and elevating its international profile to support broader strategic aims. Any references to aligning GPEDC outcomes with Indonesia's development plans, or using the co-chair platform to address domestic economic needs, are treated as evidence of national-interest pursuit.

Another key realist concept is relative gains. In contrast to liberal theories that assume states focus on absolute gains, realism posits that states worry about how gains are distributed – a state is concerned if a partner gains more, potentially shifting the balance of power (Grieco, 1988). Indicators of a relative-gains logic include Indonesia's insistence on co-chairing rather than letting another country take that role, its advocacy for inclusion of emerging donors so that traditional donors do not dominate, and its emphasis on fairness and mutual

accountability, which can be read as mechanisms to prevent any one side from gaining disproportionate advantage.

Middle-power theory adds the concepts of positional role and status. Positional influence is defined as the diplomatic leverage and agenda-setting power a state derives from its position or office in international institutions; it is measured by Indonesia's participation and leadership in key meetings (e.g., chairing GPEDC Steering Committee sessions, hosting international forums) and by feedback from other stakeholders acknowledging Indonesia's influence. Status-seeking behavior refers to actions motivated by the desire for prestige, respect, and recognition in the international community. Although status is an intangible good, realists and neoclassical realists recognize that states expend effort to improve their status because it can confer influence and deter threats; operationally, this is traced through discourses and symbolic acts aimed at demonstrating leadership, such as speeches linking the co-chair role to the nation's foreign-policy identity.

Finally, material control in the context of development cooperation is a nuanced concept introduced to capture a realist notion of control over resources and agendas. It encompasses Indonesia's attempts to direct the flow of development assistance or influence the rules such that its material interests are served, including its success in aligning donor funding with national development programs, its push for financial mechanisms or technology transfers beneficial to itself, and the establishment of its own aid initiatives (such as Indonesian AID) as a form of control.

In summary, the methodology transforms the theoretical framework into a set of analytical categories with concrete indicators: material control (evidence of Indonesia steering development resources to its advantage), positional influence (evidence of leveraging the co-chair position for diplomatic gain), relative gains (evidence of sensitivity to distributional outcomes vis-à-vis reference states), and status-seeking (evidence of prestige pursuit and leadership recognition).

These four categories guide the coding of qualitative data and the organization of the results presented below.

RESULTS AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

Across the four analytical categories, Indonesia's GPEDC co-chairmanship shows a consistent pattern: the partnership has been used less as an end in itself than as a lever for national advantage. Indonesia tied GPEDC monitoring to its own planning systems and aid priorities (material control), used the co-chair seat to convene and set agendas in global and regional forums (positional influence), protected its standing relative to traditional donors through an early-access advantage and a mutual-accountability norm (relative gains), and converted the role into recognition as a South–South development leader (status-seeking). Of these, positional influence is the most consequential: Indonesia's capacity to chair Steering Committee sessions, host the 2024 Jakarta forum, and shape the Geneva Summit Declaration gave it leverage well beyond what its aid volumes alone would predict, and this leverage underwrites the material and status gains documented below.

These findings extend, rather than contradict, the liberal-institutionalist and constructivist accounts that have dominated prior GPEDC scholarship. Where that literature reads Indonesia's advocacy for inclusive partnerships and South–South norms as evidence of cooperative identity (e.g., its bridge-builder role rooted in the Bandung Conference heritage), the findings below show the same behaviors doing double duty as a relative-gains strategy: Indonesia's push to broaden GPEDC beyond the OECD-DAC bloc reads as inclusive multilateralism on the surface but functions to dilute the bargaining power of traditional donors. This is consistent with the middle-power literature's claim that niche diplomacy serves collective and self-interested ends at once (Cooper, Higgott, & Nossal, 1993; Jordaan, 2003), but it adds empirical specificity that prior Indonesia-focused studies have lacked.

a. **Material Control: Shaping Development Cooperation to National Ends**

From a realist perspective, one expectation is that Indonesia would use the GPEDC co-chair position to increase its control over development cooperation resources and processes affecting its

interests. The evidence supports this to a significant extent. Indonesia has leveraged GPEDC mechanisms to align incoming development assistance with its national development agenda and to assert oversight over aid distribution. A core principle of GPEDC is "country ownership," which Indonesia has emphatically endorsed – effectively insisting that donors operate on Indonesia's terms. Concretely, Indonesia's National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN) 2020–2024 and related strategies are used as reference points in GPEDC dialogues (Satria, 2025). The GPEDC monitoring data offers partial confirmation: as of 2024, Indonesia scored medium (0.7 out of 1) on the "inclusiveness of development planning and accountability" indicator, reflecting that it consulted a broad range of domestic actors and integrated donor inputs via its own planning systems (Adam & Gunning, 2002). One sub-element – the percentage of development co-operation recorded on budget – was not fully reported, preventing a complete assessment (Allen, Sibahi, & Sohm, 1980). The absence of country-set targets for development cooperation was noted (Bhattacharya et al., 2025), which could imply that Indonesia prefers flexibility over being tied to externally monitored goals – a strategic choice that lets it retain control to negotiate ad hoc and ensure aid serves its evolving needs, rather than donors' metrics.

Indonesia's push for material control is further evidenced by its emphasis on integrating the GPEDC monitoring with national systems. In the 2023 kick-off meeting for the monitoring exercise, Bappenas stressed that results should feed into Indonesia's policy planning and help optimize the "enabling environment" for multi-stakeholder partnerships. Essentially, Indonesia uses GPEDC's data

and evidence to identify gaps and pressure both its own agencies and donors to address national bottlenecks; one outcome of the monitoring was guidance for the government to mobilize further resources through innovative financing aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals (United Nations, 2015).

An interesting anomaly in terms of material control is the COVID-19 pandemic response: Indonesia, through multilateral platforms like the Vaccine Alliance (Gavi), secured access to various vaccine sources during the pandemic (Hotez et al., 2021), illustrating the utilitarian logic Indonesia sees in global partnerships more broadly. Similarly, during Indonesia's G20 presidency in 2022, it identified 361 collaborative projects in sectors like health and energy (Novemyanto, 2025). Indonesian officials themselves publicly draw the link between global engagement and material gains for the country, albeit framed as mutual benefits – very much in line with realist thinking that the GPEDC is a means to ensure Indonesia gets its share of development resources, technology, and opportunities, rather than an act of charity.

b. Positional Influence: Diplomacy and Agenda-Setting from the Co-Chair Seat

Holding the co-chair position of the GPEDC has appreciably increased Indonesia's positional influence in global development diplomacy. As co-chair (alongside a traditional donor, Sweden, and a non-state representative from civil society), Indonesia sits at the center of GPEDC decision-making and gains privileged access to shape agendas, broker between stakeholders, and represent the partnership externally. One clear manifestation is Indonesia's role in convening and leading key meetings: at the Busan Global Partnership

Forum in 2025, Indonesia chaired the GPEDC Steering Committee session (Bappenas, 2025). The OECD DAC's summary record explicitly states that Indonesia "places great emphasis on outreach to the G20 and non-DAC donors" (Calleja, Casadevall Bellés, & Cichocka, 2023); in practice this meant Indonesia used its position to bring voices of major emerging economies and Southern donors into GPEDC activities, including an Asia-Pacific workshop in late 2023 held in Indonesia.

Another venue where Indonesia's positional influence was evident is the United Nations High-Level Political Forum (HLPF). In July 2023, Indonesia and Sweden jointly organized a side event on effective development cooperation, with Minister Monoarfa speaking as GPEDC co-chair in a UN setting – an influence multiplier tying Indonesia's image to global SDG agenda-setting (Fawcett, 2025). Indonesia also hosted the High-Level Forum on Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships in September 2024 in Jakarta, a mid-term global gathering for the GPEDC community (Schwarz & Rudyak, 2023) that allowed it to set the theme and showcase domestic initiatives as best practices. At the regional level, Indonesia hosted a November 2023 training session for national coordinators across Asia-Pacific on the GPEDC monitoring process (Herindrasti, Fernando, & Hop, 2025), reinforcing its role as a regional mentor on multi-stakeholder cooperation.

Indonesia's co-chair role has also entailed representation and negotiating influence in crafting global partnership policy. By the 30th GPEDC Steering Committee Meeting in Seoul (October 2025), Indonesia was firmly in the co-chair seat as the partnership finalized a new monitoring framework (Wickstead, 2015; Bhattacharya, 2017).

The Eurodad report observed that the new framework puts countries of the Global South "in the lead" in assessing donor behavior (Dodlova, 2020), reflecting a notable diplomatic win aligned with long-standing emerging-economy preferences. The Geneva Summit Declaration of 2022 also aligns closely with positions Indonesia has advocated – strengthening country ownership, focusing on the most vulnerable, and involving new actors such as the private sector (Kaasch & Wilmsen, 2024) – a synergy consistent with Indonesia actively shaping that agenda ahead of the summit.

c. Relative Gains: Ensuring Indonesia Benefits More (or at Least Not Less)

A realist analysis predicts that states care not just about absolute benefits but about who gains more. While development cooperation is not a zero-sum game in the traditional sense, the findings suggest Indonesia has been attentive to relative gains, especially vis-à-vis traditional donor countries and other emerging powers. Indonesia's informational advantage as co-chair is the clearest indicator: access to draft monitoring data, Steering Committee deliberations, and awareness of donor plans gives Indonesia a first-mover advantage in adapting to GPEDC's evolving accountability regime. When the first set of monitoring results for 11 pilot countries was released in early 2025, Indonesia could compare and learn without yet being publicly ranked; by the time its own Country Results Brief was published in September 2024, it already had the co-chair's perspective to contextualize its performance (GPEDC, 2024). This contrasts with countries not represented on the Steering Committee, which encounter evaluation results without the benefit of advance preparation.

A second dimension of relative gains concerns normative leverage. Indonesia's insistence on mutual accountability—demanding that donors report through country systems rather than imposing external metrics—shifts the compliance burden from recipient to provider. The Eurodad analysis observed that despite nearly fifteen years since the Accra Agenda, aid flows remain highly fragmented with donors frequently bypassing recipient systems (Eurodad, 2023). Indonesia's co-chair position amplifies its capacity to keep this issue on the agenda, and Indonesia is one of only 13 countries worldwide to have advanced from data collection to action planning under the Phase 5 monitoring process, a distinction marking its relative standing among the 59 participating partner countries. By championing "mutual accountability," Indonesia legitimately demands that donors change their behavior—reducing fragmentation of aid projects—to suit Indonesia's coordination capacity, rather than the reverse; it is a subtle but real shift of the power dynamic toward Indonesia.

d. Status-Seeking: Prestige and Recognition through Global Leadership

Indonesia's GPEDC co-chairmanship has also been leveraged as a platform for status-seeking – the pursuit of prestige, respect, and legitimacy in international society. Public statements and domestic media coverage give insight into Indonesia's self-perception and the image it projects: when Indonesia assumed the co-chairmanship in 2023, Bappenas's official communications framed it as a recognition of Indonesia's international standing (Bhattacharya et al., 2025), and Minister Monoarfa's statement that "Indonesia is fully committed to enhancing multi-stakeholder partnerships at the global

level through our GPEDC co-chairmanship" (Sidiropoulos, 2019) positions Indonesia as a champion of global causes while elevating domestic national pride.

Internationally, being co-chair has given Indonesia a seat among global development heavyweights and thus a status lift – it is mentioned alongside countries like Sweden in GPEDC communications (Calleja, Casadevall Bellés, & Cichocka, 2024), and its minister shares panels with high-level figures from UNDP, OECD, and donor agencies (Bau et al., 2025). Indonesia's active pursuit of hosting global events, such as the 2024 summit in Jakarta, likewise feeds into status: hosting an international summit showcases the nation as a venue for important decisions and a marker of diplomatic competence, especially in the Global South context (Haron & Arby, 2019). Indonesia's GPEDC narrative also aligns with its broader foreign-policy aspirations, carrying forward the spirit of the Bandung Conference's South–South solidarity into contemporary development cooperation (Tahalele, 2022), and complements its pursuit of OECD membership as a further status marker (Orphan & Miller, 2020).

In sum, status-seeking has been a significant driver and outcome of Indonesia's GPEDC co-chairmanship, reinforcing its self-image and external image as an important player in international affairs and illustrating how even a technical forum on aid effectiveness can be instrumentalized for the pursuit of international stature.

e. **Anomalies and Counter-Evidence**

Three observations deviate from straightforward realist predictions. First, Indonesia's promotion of inclusive civil society engagement in GPEDC processes does not serve obvious material state interests and may constrain government autonomy; the kick-off meeting for the 4th Monitoring Round included representatives from CSOs, trade unions, philanthropy, and think tanks, exceeding minimum participatory requirements (GPEDC, 2023a). Second, the GPEDC Country Results Brief reveals that only 45 percent of development cooperation indicators can be monitored using government-generated data (GPEDC, 2024), suggesting institutional capacity limitations that constrain Indonesia's ability to fully capitalize on co-chair authority. Third, Indonesia has not set country-level targets for development cooperation within the GPEDC framework, forgoing a mechanism that could strengthen its monitoring leverage. These anomalies are noted here without interpretation, which is reserved for the Discussion.

Discussion

The framework proposed above specified four analytical categories—material control, positional influence, relative gains, and status-seeking—derived from classical realism's core propositions about state behavior under anarchy, augmented by middle-power theory's predictions about niche diplomacy and institutional positioning. This section synthesizes the findings to formulate a central argument, examine how well the realist middle-power framework explains the case, assess the causal mechanism and any anomalies, and explore the implications for theory and policy.

Central argument: Indonesia's tenure as GPEDC co-chair (2023–2026) demonstrates that emerging middle powers engage in multilateral development cooperation not merely out of idealism or

norm compliance but as a strategy to enhance their national power and status. Indonesia instrumentalized the GPEDC co-chairmanship to serve realist objectives—securing material benefits, expanding influence, ensuring favorable relative gains, and elevating its prestige—all while operating within a cooperative, normative framework. This challenges any notion that Indonesia's leadership was purely altruistic or purely constrained by international norms; instead, it was a calculated pursuit of national interest, executed with the subtlety and legitimacy afforded by middle-power diplomacy.

The first supporting argument is that Indonesia's co-chairmanship was driven by strategic motives to advance national interest rather than by normative impulse alone. Minister Monoarfa referenced vaccine access through global partnerships and the identification of 361 collaborative projects during Indonesia's G20 presidency as evidence that "effective multilateralism" yields concrete returns. The simultaneous launch of Indonesian AID and the effort to integrate GPEDC monitoring outcomes with domestic development planning (GPEDC, 2023a) confirm an interest-based approach, consistent with the realist proposition that states join international institutions when doing so furthers self-interest (Mearsheimer, 1994) and that even moral aspirations in foreign policy are guided by calculations of interest (Morgenthau, 1948; Wibisono, 2010).

The second argument concerns Indonesia's deployment of middle-power behavioral repertoires—coalition-building, bridge-building, forum-hosting—in service of positional advancement. Indonesia took on mediator roles by bringing non-DAC donors into GPEDC conversations (OECD, 2023) and hosted forums connecting diverse development actors, behaviors consistent with Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal's (1993) characterization of middle-power multilateral activism. Jordaan's (2003) observation that emerging middle powers combine order-keeping with reformist objectives fits Indonesia's advocacy for Southern voice reform within GPEDC's existing institutional architecture; the middle-power activism is thus in service of, not contradictory to, realist self-interest. Indonesia also

advanced its South–South and Triangular Cooperation agenda under the GPEDC umbrella: Indonesian AID, launched in 2019 with a sizable endowment, demonstrates Indonesia's material commitment to being a provider of aid, giving it leverage to co-finance projects with traditional donors and steer them in directions beneficial to Indonesian foreign policy.

The third argument is that Indonesia's GPEDC behavior reflects a pursuit of relative gains and status that liberal or constructivist accounts would underestimate. Indonesia's insistence on mutual accountability—demanding that donors modify their practices, not only recipients—reveals sensitivity to distributional power dynamics within the partnership (Eurodad, 2023; OECD, 2023). The evidence of calculated advantages—early access to monitoring data, normative leverage from co-chair authority, agenda-setting power—suggests Indonesia was attentive to its positional gains relative to both traditional donors and peer emerging economies. On status, Indonesia's domestic and international projection of the co-chairmanship as a leadership accomplishment confirms the realist reading that states seek prestige because it enhances influence and bargaining power (Schweller, 1994), while its concurrent pursuit of OECD membership aligns with a desire to translate economic growth into recognized political standing (Gilpin, 1981).

Understanding Indonesia's realist motives in GPEDC carries practical implications for stakeholders. Traditional donors might realize that giving leadership roles to emerging powers can incentivize those powers to support the international system—Indonesia became an advocate for effectiveness principles because it got to helm the effort, a positive-sum result achieved by acknowledging Indonesia's desire for respect and influence. For developing countries, Indonesia's experience suggests that proactive engagement and taking initiative can yield greater voice and ensure one's interests are reflected. If every emerging power engaged solely for self-interest, fragmentation or rivalry might be feared even within cooperative forums; however, GPEDC's inclusive design and mutual-benefit framing have, in this case, aligned

Indonesia's interests with collective progress, implying that effective multilateral leadership requires a blend of realism and idealism.

Returning to the anomalies identified earlier, Indonesia's promotion of inclusive civil-society engagement that does not serve obvious material interest, the capacity constraints revealed by the 45 percent data-coverage figure, and its choice not to set country-level targets are each explicable within the realist middle-power framework once status and relative-gains logics are taken into account: civil-society inclusion builds normative legitimacy that reinforces status, capacity gaps reflect institutional limits rather than a lack of intent, and withholding fixed targets preserves Indonesia's negotiating flexibility. None of the three anomalies, therefore, decisively falsifies the central argument, though they do indicate that Indonesia's realism operates through soft-power and institutional channels rather than coercive or material ones.

In conclusion, the discussion reaffirms that Indonesia's GPEDC co-chairmanship is best understood by acknowledging the realist underpinnings of its middle-power activism. Indonesia's case does not refute liberal or constructivist insights – it weaves them into a larger realist fabric. Cooperation and norm adherence were vehicles for power accumulation and status enhancement. The causal link between co-chairing and Indonesia's elevated influence and status is evident, confirming the study's initial theoretical proposition. This holistic understanding is crucial for both analysts and practitioners: it tempers idealistic expectations with a realistic appraisal of motives, thereby allowing for more effective design of partnerships where national interests are harnessed towards shared goals.

Conclusion

Indonesia's co-chairmanship of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation from 2023 to 2026 exemplifies how an emerging middle power can exploit a multilateral role in pursuit of its own strategic ends while contributing to collective objectives. This study set out to determine how Indonesia's GPEDC leadership

serves its national interests and power ambitions, employing a framework grounded in classical realism and middle-power theory. The analysis found that Indonesia used the co-chair platform to advance material interests, by aligning development cooperation with its domestic priorities and augmenting resource mobilization; to expand its influence, by shaping agendas and acting as a diplomatic bridge in the development arena; to secure relative gains, by ensuring that it and fellow developing countries gained more equitable voice vis-à-vis traditional donors; and to seek status, by showcasing itself as a capable and responsible leader on the global stage. The GPEDC co-chair role has indeed been harnessed to serve Indonesia's national interest and augment its power – albeit in soft-power and institutional forms – consistent with realist expectations.

Three findings sit awkwardly within a strict realist reading and are worth flagging rather than explaining away. Indonesia's promotion of inclusive civil-society participation in GPEDC processes does not map onto any obvious material payoff and arguably constrains the government's own negotiating room; its Country Results Brief shows that only 45 percent of development-cooperation indicators can be monitored with government-generated data, pointing to capacity limits rather than strategic choice; and Indonesia has declined to set country-level targets, forgoing a lever that would have strengthened its own monitoring position. None of these discrepancies overturns the central argument, but together they show that Indonesia's realism operates mainly through soft-power and institutional channels—legitimacy-building, agenda access, normative leverage—rather than direct material coercion. This is the study's main contribution beyond existing accounts: GPEDC scholarship has read Indonesia's leadership as either normative commitment (liberal or constructivist) or has left it outside realist analysis altogether; showing power-seeking and institutional capacity limits operating side by side demonstrates that even a nominally technical, inclusive partnership remains a site of power politics once institutional leadership is at stake, and it extends middle-power theory beyond its largely Western-centric case base to a large developing-country leader.

The findings carry three caveats that point directly to further research. First, co-chairmanship's effect cannot be cleanly isolated from Indonesia's concurrent G20 membership, 2023 ASEAN chairmanship, and bilateral donor relationships, so some of the leverage attributed here to GPEDC may be shared with these other platforms. Second, the analysis relies on publicly available documents and secondary reports; closed-door negotiations and internal government debate are not observable with this evidence base. Third, the single-case design offers depth at the cost of generalizability, since Indonesia's size, regional leadership, and historical narrative are not easily replicated elsewhere. Comparative work against other GPEDC co-chairs or similar leadership arrangements—for instance, Mexico's GPEDC role or South Africa's leadership in African Union development initiatives—would test whether the material-positional-relative-status framework travels beyond the Indonesian case, and a post-2026 follow-up could assess whether Indonesia's gains outlasted its tenure. For practice, the findings suggest that international partnerships secure stronger buy-in from emerging powers by giving them real agenda-setting roles rather than symbolic participation: Indonesia's leadership reinvigorated attention to aid effectiveness in the Global South and strengthened its own credibility ahead of its OECD accession bid, outcomes unlikely to have followed from a purely consultative role.

In closing, the analysis confirms that power and principle are not mutually exclusive in global cooperation; rather, they often intertwine. Indonesia advanced principles of effective aid – ownership, inclusivity, accountability – while also advancing its power, influence, and status. Emerging states can and will champion international norms when doing so elevates their position. The interplay of realist self-interest and cooperative engagement evidenced by Indonesia may well be a hallmark of twenty-first-century multilateralism, as more states seek a greater voice in writing the rules of the international order. As the GPEDC approaches its next leadership transition and Indonesia consolidates its OECD accession bid, whether Jakarta's returns from GPEDC co-chairmanship prove durable or ephemeral will test

whether niche diplomacy in development governance generates lasting positional advantage or merely transient prestige.

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